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The proposed Federal Criminal Codefeatures several innovations aimed at the
problem of disparatesentencing In keeping with the Journalof Criminal Law and
Criminologs singular interdisciflinay tradition, we present below two viewpoints
rarely encountered together. The first is a criminologicalevaluation of sentencing disparitiesbased on empiricalstudies by a research group. In the second,Judge Tjoftat
provides a legal anaysis ofthe same issue, drawing on his practicalexperience on the
federal bench. They complement and supplement one another.
THE EDITORS
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the courtroom on probation,or be lockedupfor a term ofyears that may consume the rest

of his lif, or something in between.
Judge Marvin E. Frankel'

I.

INTRODUCTION

To make sentencing in federal courts more evenhanded and rational, the proposed revision of the Federal Criminal Code would establish a sentencing commission.2 Within limits established by the
legislature, the sentencing commission would establish sentencing guidelines for different types of offenders, offenses, and purposes of sentencing.
In addition, the commission would establish a research program to generate information on the effectiveness of sentences imposed and to use
that research to recommend modifications of statutes relating to sentencing that produce more effective, humane, and rational sentencing.
The research described in this paper is directed towards assessing the
extent to which disparity is likely in current federal courts' sentencing
practices, and to describe a logic that best accounts for current sentencing practices. This research, and the larger project from which it is
drawn, was developed to establish an empirical basis for the initial work
of a sentencing commission, and to estimate the extent of the problems
in sentencing to which the reforms are addressed.
Most observers of the criminal justice system agree that there are
unfair disparities in the sentences meted out in the courts. Indeed, a
majority of federal judges believe that the problem exists at least to some
extent. 3 However, agreement ends with this, for there is considerable
debate about the extent of the problem and the degree to which disparity is attributable to the judge's sentencing style, philosophy on the role
of criminal sanction, overall tendency to be lenient or harsh, and other
factors.
There is little empirical evidence on the extent and sources of sentence disparity in the federal courts, and virtually no empirical investigation of the phenomenon on a national scale. Judge Marvin Frankel
has argued that federal sentence disparity is a serious problem, but has
offered only primarily anecdotal documentation.4 Partridge and Eldridge 5 demonstrate significant variation in the responses of judges in
t M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 6 (1973).
2 See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III, §§ 994-95. See also id. tit. I, §§ 2001-09, 210106, 2201-04, 2301-06, 3725; tit. III, §§ 991-93, 996-97 (1980).
3 Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Judicial Reactions to Sentencing Guidelines 3-4
(1980).
4 M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, passim.
5 A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY (Federal
Judicial Center 1974).
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one circuit to hypothetical cases. A more recent study by Diamond and
Zeisel provides empirical evidence for the existence of serious disparity,
but their findings are limited to two federal jurisdictions. 6 Research
conducted for the New York State Executive Advisory Committee on
Sentencing using simulation techniques, demonstrated disparity among
New York state judges. 7 Finally, Rhodes and Conly, 8 using a large sample of cases drawn from several jurisdictions, provide empirical analyses
of the factors concerning the defendant and the case that affect sentencing decisions. However, this analysis of actual sentencing decisions permits limited inferences regarding the effect of an individual judge on the
sentencing decision.
This paper reports the results of the first national survey of federal
judges on the extent and causes of sentence disparity. The study had
three principal objectives: determination of the extent of sentence disparity, examination of the effect of specific case characteristics on sentence decisions, and determination of the effect of various attributes of
the judge and the judicial environment on sentence decisions.
A.

DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF SENTENCE DISPARITY

To determine sentence disparity, the study looked at the relative
amounts of consensus and dissensus among federal judges regarding the
possible sentences for sixteen hypothetical cases. There are two types of
sentence disparity. The first type is interjudge disparity which occurs
when there is dissensus among judges over the appropriate sentence for
cases with effectively identical offense/offender characteristics. The second type is intrajudge disparity. It occurs when there is instability over
time of a given judge's sentences for cases with identical or extremely
similar offense/offender profiles. Table 1 illustrates the two types of disparity with hypothetical data. The table reveals dissensus among the
three judges concerning the length of prison terms and instability over
time for Judges X and Z, but not Judge Y. This paper will deal with
only the first type of disparity-dissensus among judges, or interjudge
disparity. Consequently, any disparity revealed by the analysis probably understates its actual extent. Throughout this paper the phrases
6 S. DIAMOND & H. ZEISEL, SENTENCING COUNCILS: A STUDY OF SENTENCE DISPARITY AND ITS REDUCTION (forthcoming). This study was conducted in the Northern District
of Illinois and the Eastern District of New York.
7 NEW YORK STATE EXECUTIvE ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK: AN INQUIRY INTO SENTENCING AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRIME AND PUNISHMENT].
8 W. RHODES & C. CONLY, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL SENTENCING (Inst. for Law and Soc.
Research) (forthcoming).
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"dissensus among judges" and "sentence disparity" will be used interchangeably, except where this could prove confusing.
TABLE 1
HYPOTHETICAL DATA TO ILLUSTRATE THE Two
DIMENSIONS OF SENTENCE DISPARITY

(Prison sentences for identical cases (in years) by judge and time)
JUDGE
MEAN
TIME

X

Y

Z

SENTENCE

T,
T2

3
4

5
5

4
6

4
5

T3

2

5

2

3

MEAN SENTENCE

3

5

4

Consistent with this conceptualization, we have operationalized
dissensus as the degree to which judges disagree about the sentence that
should be served by offenders found guilty in sixteen hypothetical cases.
For each of these cases, judges received seven pieces of information
about the offender and the offense and were asked to make a sentencing
decision. As the sixteen cases were identical, or "held constant," for all
judges in the survey, disagreement about sentences is a measure of interjudge disparity, or dissensus. 9 Thus, for these sixteen cases, the first
objective of the analysis was to partition the variance in sentence decisions into two parts: (1) that on which judges agree and which is directly attributable to characteristics of the case; and (2) that on which
there is dissensus not attributable to the case, but rather to the judge or
elements of the judge's environment. In statistical terms, this partition
separates that proportion of decision variance accounted for by the
characteristics of the case from the unexplained variance that is considered attributable to the judge.
9 This is not the only possible interpretation of this disagreement. Since the cases
presented to judges contained seven pieces of information-less than would occur in the real
world--arguably, at least some of the disagreement about sentences would diminish were
additional information presented to the judge. However, the former interpretation is supported by Wilkins and Gottfredson, and by Hogarth, who provided evidence that sentencing
and parole decisionmakers do not base their decisions on more than about five factors, or sets
of factors. Ste D. GOTTFREDSON & L. WILKINS, THE UTILIZATION OF EXPERIENCE IN PAROLE DECISION-MAKING: A SUMMARY REPORT (Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement and Crim.
Just. 1974); J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971). In any event, they are
based on hypothetical cases, so the figures reported in this article should be interpreted only
as indicators of the degree of dissensus that occurs among judges rather than precise measures
of actual disparity in real sentences.
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The second and third objectives involve more detailed analyses of
each portion of this partitioned variance in sentence decisions-the role
of specific case characteristics and the role of particular attributes of the
judge and the judicial environment.
DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF SPECIFIC CASE CHARCTERISTICS ON

B.

SENTENCE DECISIONS

The study examined the influence of the following seven case characteristics on sentence decisions: (1) the offense itself (two were considered, bank robbery and fraud), (2) the offender's age, (3) the offender's
criminal record, (4) the offender's role as principal or accomplice to the
offense, (5) method of case disposition (plea or trial), (6) the dollar
amount involved, and (7) the role of membership in an ongoing criminal organization (for fraud offenses) or the use of a weapon (for bank
robbery). The study used these seven factors because other empirical
investigations of sentence decisions conducted at the state and local level
have indicated their importance.' 0
An additional element of this objective was to determine the ways
in which certain offense or offender profiles elicit judgments about the
appropriate goals of a sentence which, in turn, influence the sentence
itself.l ' For example, what attributes of the case "cue" the judge that
the principal goal of the sanction should be general deterrence rather
than, say, incapacitation?- Moreover, how do these case-specific goals
influence the nature and extent of the sentence imposed? Case-specific
goal articulation is a potential source of both dissensus and consensus in
sentence decisions. Goal articulation aggravates the problem of sentence disparity to the degree that identical cases yield disparate goals
which in turn, produce disparate sentences. If judges agree on sentence
goals in specific cases, and agreement on goals does indeed lead to similar sentences, then goal articulation contributes to the maintenance of
uniformity in sentencing.
DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF VARIOUS ATTRIBUTES OF THE

C.

JUDGE AND THE JUDICIAL ENVIRONMENT ON SENTENCE
DECISIONS

Is dissensus about the appropriate sentence related to characteristics of the judge and the judicial environment in which he works? Iden10

L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING

GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION (Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement and
Grim. Just. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
11 For a discussion of judges' and other legal professionals' views of the criminal justice

system's overall goals, see Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Sentencing Goals and their Application in the Federal Courts (August 1980).

1981]

CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM

tifying the source of interjudge disparity in sentence decisions could
furnish valuable insights into methods of curtailing future disparity.
The study analyzed five sets of factors having no direct bearing on the
case itself to understand what accounts for disparate sentences given for
identical cases: (1) differential perceptions of the severity of different
sentences, (2) the judge's propensity to give relatively harsh sentences,
(3) the judge's overall goal orientation regarding criminal sanction, for
example, his predisposition regarding the functions of sentences, regardless of the specifics of the case, (4) background characteristics such as
demographics and career history, and (5) the region of the country in
which the judge's district is located.
The discussion below is keyed to these three objectives, graduallly
unfolding the logic of sentencing decisions that judges made in the survey interview. However, before presenting these findings, it is necessary
to describe the methodology employed.
II.

METHODOLOGY

There are three key elements of the methodology: the sample and
12
field work, the questionnaire, and the analytic techniques.
THE SAMPLE AND FIELD WORK

Two-hundred-sixty-four active federal district judges, interviewed
between September and November, 1979, comprised the sample. Professional interviewers personally conducted interviews in the judges'
chambers or other offices located in the court building. The average
interview lasted ninety minutes.
THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The results reported in this paper reflect responses to a significant
portion of the survey interview. All of the questionnaire items used in
these analyses were structured, except that judges were free to give
whatever sentences they chose to hypothetical case scenarios. There
were four sets of questions.
The first set required judges to make sentencing decisions based on
attributes of the offender and the offense. This involved three tasks:
12 Technical descriptions of major aspects of the methods employed are available upon
request from the authors.
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TABLE 2
EXAMPLES OF CASE SCENARIOS
CARD #1

Offense:

The offense committed was bank robbery

Age:

The offender is between 18 and 24 years
old

Record:

The offender has no past criminal record

Role:

The offender was an accomplice; he was
following the lead of others

Plea/Trial:

The offender entered a plea of guilty

Extent of Injury
to Victim:
Dollar Amount:

A weapon was used and at least one of the
victims suffered serious personal injury
The total amount involved was less than
$1,000

CARD

#2

Offense:

The offense committed was fraud

Age:

The offender was 35 to 65 years old

Record:

The offender has a dozen previous arrests,
most for serious offenses, and has been
convicted four times

Role:

The offender was an accomplice; he was
following the lead of others

Plea/Trial:

The offender entered a plea of guilty

Organization:

The offender is not a member of any
criminal organization

Dollar Amount:

The total amount involved was less than
$1,000

Task 1. Interviewers presented the judges with sixteen offense/offender case "scenarios" and asked them to choose the appropriate sentence. Two examples of these scenarios appear as Table 2.
Judges were free to administer sentences that comprised any combination of prison time (in months), supervised time (in months), and fine (in
dollars). Moreover, they were instructed to indicate the actual sentence
that should be served by the offender. In order to maximize the poten-
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tial for drawing statistical inferences about the effect of each factor on
sentence decisions, the scenarios reflect an incomplete orthogonal experimental design.1 3 Note that the study used two opposite extreme values
of each factor in the scenarios. Across all scenarios, these extreme levels
of each factor were evenly balanced to insure orthogonality. Table 3
provides a full display of the factors, and the levels within factors, for the
sixteen offense/offender scenarios.
TABLE 3
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR 16 OFFENSE/OFFENDER
SCENARIOS
SCENARIO #

I. ..............
2 ..............
3 ..............
4 .............
5 .............
6 ..............
7 ...............
8 ...............
9 ...............
10 ...............
II ..............
12 ...............
13 ...............
14 ..............
15 ..............
16 ..............

CRIME

AGE

Robbery
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Robbery
Fraud
Robbery

Young
Old
Young
Old
Old
Young
Old
Young
Old
Young
Old
Young
Young
Old
Young
Old

RECORD

None
Long
Long
None
None
Long
Long
None
Long
None
None
Long
Long
None
None
Long

ROLE

Accomplice
Accomplice
Accomplice
Accomplice
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Principal
Aoomplice
Accomplice
Accomplice
Accomplice

GUILTY BY

Plea
Plea
Trial
Trial
Trial
Trial
Plea
Plea
Trial
Trial
Plea
Plea
Plea
Plea
Trial
Trial

DOLLAR
AMOUNT

Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High

CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATION

N.A.
No
N.A.
Yes
N.A..
No
N.A.
Yes
Yes
N.A.
No
N.A.
Yes
N.A.
No
N.A.

WEAPON

Yes
N.A.
No
N.A.
Yes
N.A.
No
N.A.
N.A.
No
N.A.
Yes
N.A.
No
N.A.
Yes

SPECIFICATIONSOF EXTREME LEVELS USED IN THE SCENARIOS

Xs r:
Rtaad:
Dolar Amummt:
Criminal Orgaxizati=1W/mpwa:

Young - 18-24 years old
Old - 35-64 years old
None - No prior arrests
Long - 12 arrests and 4 convictions for serious offenses
Low ss than $1,000
High - More than S100,000
NA. - Does not apply to this scenario

This entire sequence of questions constitutes an experiment that
was incorporated into the questionnaire. The sixteen case scenarios are
logically equivalent to experimental treatments or stimuli, and the sentence imposed is the response to the stimuli. In keeping with this experimental parlance, any variance in the sentence decisions imposed that is
not attributable to the stimuli (Le., the specific characteristics of the case
and the offender) is assumed to be attributable to the subject (Le., the
judge). Thus, the amount of variance unaccounted for by the factors in
the scenarios is interpretable as the degree of dissensus among judges
about sentence decisions.
Task 2. The second task was a simplified version of the first.
Judges gave monadic (ie., individual, one-at-a-time) ratings of the influence that extreme and intermediate levels of each factor should have on
the severity of a sentence. The study used a standard seven-point scale,
13 See W. COCHRAN & G. Cox, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 439-82 (1957).
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anchored at either end by "should make the sentence much tougher".
versus "should make the sentence much lighter." Gathering these monadic ratings is necessary to facilitate interpolations of the effects of intermediate levels of each factor. (Recall that only extreme levels were
incorporated into the scenarios used in Task 1.)
Task 3. Finally, judges were asked to indicate the goal they hoped
to achieve with their sentence for four of the sixteen offense/offender
scenarios. The four scenarios were randomly selected in each interview.
The goal alternatives presented to the judge were general deterrence,
special deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution/deservedness.
The second set of questions, asked separately from the first, look at
the perceived severity of sentences. This was done because judges do not
give sentences in a single or metric "currency." Rather, sentences are
composites of at least three components: prison time, supervised time,
and fine. Possibly judges have differential perceptions of the severity of
each of these components of a sentence; or perhaps they disagree about
the severity equivalences across these components. The study contained
questions designed to map the three components of a sentence into a
single composite index of perceived sentence severity. The questioning
procedure parallels the one described above for sentence decisionmaking. It entailed two tasks:
Task . Judges indicated their perception of the severity of each of
nine composite sentences composed of prison time, supervised time, and
fine. 14 The severity scale had seven points, ranging from "extremely severe" to "extremely lenient." The nine sentence composites were constructed according to the same experimental design principles that
guided the construction of the sixteen offense/offender scenarios. Table
4 displays the nine sentence composites and reveals the experimental
design that supported their construction.
Task 2. The second task involved monadic ratings of the severity/leniency of extreme and intermediate levels of prison time, supervised time and fine.
The third set of questions elicited attitudinal data on current sentencing policies, including the perceived importance of various goals of
criminal sanction. The final set collected background information on
the judge, such as age, years of experience, prior career history, region of
the country, and so forth.
14 A number of judges found it difficult to evaluate severity without having a specific
crime or offender whom they were judging. In analyzing these data, each judge's responses
were individually constructed into a ranking of relative severities of alternative sentence combinations.
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TABLE 4
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR THE NINE SENTENCE
COMPOSITES
SENTENCE
COMPOSITE #

SUPERVISED
PRISON TIME

TIME

FINE

(YEARS)

(YEARS)

($)

1

0

0

0

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

2
25
0
2
25
0
2
25

2
5
2
5
0
5
,0
2

5,000
30,000
30,000
0
5,000
5,000
30,000
0

ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES

The study employed several analytic techniques. Repeated measures analysis of variance indicated the role of case characteristics and
the judge in sentencing decisions. Interpolation and extrapolation techniques estimated the effects of intermediate levels of offender/offense
characteristics that were not included in the scenarios, but instead were
asked monadically. 15 Analysis of variance determined the role of casespecific goals in sentence disparities. Micromodeling analyzed the perceived severity of sentences for each judge. Finally, the effect of judges'
.background characteristics on sentence decisions was determined
through analysis of variance followed by step-wise regression analysis..
15 Responses to these monadic questions were also used to test the reliability of responses
to the scenario questions. Because the simulation procedures used to elicit sentences to the
hypothetical scenarios are somewhat artificial, we were concerned that judges' responses
might be unstable. Therefore, a correlation analysis was run, relating the -effects of each
factor (e.g., offense) in the scenario analysis to other data provided by the judge later in the
interview on the seriousness of each factor. For instance, the judge's individual ratings of the
effect of a weapon on their sentence was correlated with the effects observed in scenarios that
included use of a weapon by the offender. These correlation analyses showed a very strong
relationship-in some cases over .9-between monadic factor score ratings and scenario ratings of the same factors, suggesting that responses to the scenarios provide reliable estimates of
sentences.
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TABLE 5
PARTITIONING OF INCARCERATION DECISION VARIANCE

(N = 208)
UNIQUE
VARIANCE IN
DECISION TO
IMPRISON

SOURCE OF VARIANCE:

Offense/Offender Characteristics (main effects)

37%

Judge/Environment (main effects)

10%

Interaction Effects (between offense/offender
characteristics and between judge and
offense/offender characteristics)

53%

TABLE 6
SUMMARY:

PARTITIONING OF SENTENCE DECISION
VARIANCE (N = 208)
UNIQUE VARIANCE FOR:
PRISON TIME SUPERVISED TIME FINE

SOURCE OF VARIANCE:

Offense/Offender
Characteristics (main effects)

45%

Judge Environment (main effects)

21%

55%

38%

Interaction Effects (between offense/offender characteristics
and between judge and offense/offender characteristics)

34%

44%

58%

III.
A.

1%

4%

FINDINGS

HOW MUCH DISPARITY?

The survey results suggest that sentence disparity does exist. The
amount of such disparity varies depending on which aspect of the sentencing decision is examined.1 6 If one concentrates strictly on the decision to incarcerate, the disparity is modest (see Table 5). However,
when one examines the full range of sentencing options simultaneously,
16 Commentators have posited several theories about how the sentencing decision is actually made. One is that the process has two steps, the first of which is to determine whether or
not the offender should be incarcerated, and the second, to determine the length of incarceration. Se SENTENCING GUIDELINES, .fra note 10, for discussion of this view. An alternative
view is that judges weigh all their sanctioning alternatives simultaneously. The discussion in
this article concentrates on the latter view.
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TABLE 7
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS:

EFFECTS OF

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS,
JUDGES/ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERACTIONS ON PRISON TIME
UNIQUE
VARIANCE

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

F-TEST
RATIO

SIGNIFICANCE

Offense/Offender Characteristics
(main effects)

45%

49,735

3316

271

<.001

Judge/Environment (main effects)

21%

23,916

116

9.7

<.001

34%

37,985

12

SOURCE OF VARIANCE

Interaction Effects (between of-

fense/offender characteristics
and between judge and offense/offender characteristics)

more dissensus appears. More variance in sentences is explained by differences among individual judges than by any other single factor. See
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. Differences among judges play a particularly
strong role in accounting for the amounts of supervised time and fines,
completely overwhelming the variance explained by all of the offender/offense characteristics measured in the survey results. The judge
is less a factor in explaining the length of a convicted offender's prison
term, but is nonetheless significant. The judge accounts for 21% of the
variance in the prison term imposed, compared to 45% that is attributable to characteristics of the case.
This partitioning of sentence decision variance understates the
amount of disparity exhibited in responses to the sixteen cases tested in
the survey because additional disparity is harbored in the interaction
effects that are also displayed in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9. To understand
this point, it is necessary to digress and provide a brief explanation of
interaction effects. Interactions are conditional effects. The relationship
between an independent variable and the dependent variable depends
on the value of another independent variable-being greater for certain
values of the second, independent variable than for others.
Table 10 provides an example of an interaction between two case
characteristics. 17 Offenders who are accomplices get shorter prison
terms than those who are principals (6.2 years vs. 7.8 years). Simil~.rly,
offenders who plead guilty are sentenced to less time in prison than of17 This example can be elaborated to include interactions between three, four, or more
independent variables.
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TABLE 8
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS:

EFFECTS OF

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS,
JUDGES/ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERACTIONS ON SUPERVISED TIME
UNIQUE
VARIANCE

SOURCE OF VARIANCE

Offense/Offender Characteristics
(main effects)

SUM OF
SQUARES

1%

MEAN
SQUARES

F-TEST
RATIO SIGNIFICANCE

350.7

23.4

6.7

< .001

18.7

< .001

Judge/Environment (main effects)

55%

13,798

65.4

Interaction Effects (between offense/offender characteristics
and between judge and offense/offender characteristics)

44%

11,045

3.5

TABLE 9
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS:

EFFECTS OF

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS,
JUDGES/ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERACTIONS ON FINE
SOURCE OF VARIANCE

Offense/Offender characteristics
(main effects)
Judge/Environment (main effects)
Interaction Effects (between offense/offender characteristics
and between judge and offense/offender characteristics)

UNIQUE
VARIANCE

SUM OF
SQUARES

MEAN
SQUARES

F-TEST
RATIO

SIGNIFICANCE

4%

7,455

497

11.7

<.001

38%

71,112

421

9.95

< .001

58%

107,335

42.3

fenders found guilty through a trial (6.8 vs. 7.2 years). However, even
though offenders who plead guilty get lighter sentences on the average
(6.8 vs. 7.2), the impact on pleading is quite large for accomplices (5.6
vs. 6.7), but actually reversed for principals (8.0 vs. 7.6). Clearly there is
some effect other than the cumulative impact of the two independent
factors that only interaction can explain.
The interaction effects that are indicated in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 are
each composites of two basic types of interactions. The first type includes interactions between the various offense/offender characteristics
and, thus, are like the example given above. The second type of interaction is between the judges and specific offense/offender characteristics
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TABLE 10
INTERACTION BETWEEN OFFENDER'S ROLE IN THE CRIME
AND THE METHOD OF DISPOSITION ON MEAN

PRISON TIME (IN YEARS) (N = 208)
METHOD OF DISPOSITION
FOUND GUILTY
ROLE IN THE CRIME

PLEA OF GUILTY

BY TRIAL

MEAN

6.2
6.7
5.6
Accomplice ......
7.8
7.6
8.0
Principal .........
7.2
6.8
............
Mean
and represents patterned differences between judges in the influence of
offense/offender characteristics on their sentence decisions. This second
type of interaction is an additional form of sentence dissensus.
This point returns us to the earlier claim that our initial partitioning of decision variance underestimated the disparity measured in the
survey, for the majority of these interactions are of the second type, between the judge and specific offense/offender characteristics. Table 11
furnishes a breakdown of these interactions. The most important interactions affecting prison term and supervised time involve the offense itself and the offender's record. Indeed, the rank order of the magnitude
of all six interactions is identical for both prison and supervised time.
When the two crimes tested were bank robbery and fraud, the sizeable
interaction variance attributable to the offense itself (11.7% for prison
term and 8.5% for supervised time) suggests that judges have rather different perceptions of the seriousness of common crime and white-collar
crime. However, the amount of fine imposed is highly contingent on the
judge's concern about the dollar damage inflicted by the crime. Thirtysix percent of interaction variance is attributable to dollar damage, compared to 4.8% for the offense and 1% for the offender's record. These
findings regarding interactions generally strengthen the inference that
sentence dissensus is a major factor in explaining sentence decisionmaking. They suggest that disparity is not simply random divergence of
opinion about the sentence that should be imposed, but is also a consequence of patterned differences of opinion about the influence that specific case attributes should have on the sentence.
.Then, too, the lesser role played by interactions between case attributes themselves (the first type of interaction discussed above) suggests that the logic underpinning sentence decisions is relatively
straightforward and "additive." This is not to say that the decision logic
is simple. The data do suggest, however, that decisions are generally not
characterized by multiple contingencies or conditional logic whereby
any given datum about the offender or the offense takes on altered
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TABLE 11
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SPECIFIC
OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
JUDGE

(N = 208)
DECISION VARIANCE EXPLAINED
FOR:
SUPERVISED

JUDGE INTERACTION WITH:

PRISON TIME

Offense ..................
Offender's Record .......
Dollar Damage ..........
Offender's Age ..........
Offender's Role in the
Crime ................
Method of Disposition ..
Total variance attributable to
two-way interactions between
offense/offender characteristics
and judge:

TIME

FINE

11.7%
4.8%
2.3%
1.5%

8.5%
8.4%
2.6%
2.0%

4.8%
1.0%
36.0%
1.9%

1.5%
1.0%

2.0%
1.4%

2.3%
0.3%

22.8%

24.9%

46.3%

meaning given other data about the case. The logic of sentence decisions is explored further in the following section, which treats the role of
each case characteristic and the role of the goal the judge hopes to
achieve with the sentence imposed.
B.

THE LOGIC OF SENTENCE DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF SPECIFIC CASE
ATTRIBUTES AND CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS

Case Attributes
Not surprisingly, the attributes of the offender and the offense have
a significant bearing on the sentence imposed. However, these effects
are anything but uniform across the three components of sentences. All
of the case characteristics studied have a significant impact on the prison
term, but only the past record of the offender influences the amount of
supervised time, while the crime and the age of the offender affect the
fine imposed (see Table 12). These patterns support the inference (also
not surprising) that prison term is the most important element of a sentence and as such, is most sensitive to the various nuances of the case.
The most important determinant of the prison term variable is the
crime itself, suggesting that fundamental convictions held among the
judiciary about the relative gravity of common crime as opposed to
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white-collar crime, and that- common crimes are better punished with
longer incarceration terms. This is corroborated by the tendency of
judges to impose relatively heavy fines for the fraud cases. Also quite
important is a set of factors related to the amount of harm caused by the
crime and indicators of the harm that the offender might potentially
have on society. In rank order these include the offender's past criminal
record, the use of a weapon and the injury inflicted, the offender's membership in a criminal organization, the dollar damage of the crime, and
the prominence of the offender's role in the crime. The method of case
disposition has a modest, though statistically significant, impact on the
prison sentence. The relationship between prison sentence and the offender's age is somewhat more complicated. Judges show some leniency
for juveniles (under 18 years of age) and younger offenders (18 to 24
years), are somewhat harsher for middle-age offenders (25 to 60 years),
and are lenient for older offenders (over 60 years of age).18 There is, of
course, an artificial quality to these data. When actually sentencing,
judges may construct composite sentences of prison time, supervision,
and fine. To examine the effect of different factors on each of these
sentence components separately does not account for trade-offs among
them. Even prison time, clearly the most important component of the
criminal sanction, does not constitute the complete sentence. A full understanding of the sentencing decision process requires that the three
components be considered simultaneously for any given case. A subsequent section of this report therefore combines these three sentence components into a single measure to evaluate sentence disparities and the
influence of specific case characteristics. However, before these findings
18 As a test of the reliability of these findings, these data were compared to
Rhodes/Conly analysis of actual sentence decisions. See note 8 supra. Direct comparisons
difficult because of the formulation of the analytic equations and differences in both
dependent and dependent variable definition. However, four key variables were ranked
their influence on prison terms with the following results.
Yankelovich
INSLAW - Actual
andeWht
Data Impact

and White

Rank Order on Effect of:
Prior record ........................
Age ...............................
Role in crime ......................
Plea ...............................

Simulation
Impact on
Prison Term
1
2
3
4

o

the
are
infor

r s nT r

on Prison Term
Bank
Fraud
Robbery
1
4
2
3

1
2
3
4

The only difference occurs in age in actual fraud cases, and is probably a reflection of differences in the age distribution of actual offenders and the hypothetical offenders described in
the survey.
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TABLE 12
EFFECT OF SPECIFIC OFFENSE/OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS ON PRISON TIME, SUPERVISED
TIME, AND FINE

AVERAGE SENTENCESa

=

84 months of prison time/20 months of
supervised time/$1536 of fine.

N = 208
INCREASE (+) OR DECREASE (-)

CASE CHARACTERISTICS

IN AVERAGE SEN-

TENCE DUE TO CASE CHARACTERISTICS
PRISON
SUPERVISED
TIME
TIME
FINE
(MONTHS)
(MONTHS)
($)

Type of Crime
c

Bank Robbery ................

+33

n.s.

Fraud .......................

-33

n.s.

+617

Under l8b ...................

-12.0

n.s.

-536

18-24 ......................
25 - 35b ...........................
35-60 ......................

-- 6.8
+ 4.3
+ 6.8-

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

-306
+193
+306

Over 60b .....................

-

n.s.

+155

-617

Age

3.5

Record
No past record ................
No record; but suspectedb ......

1 arrest; no convictionsb ........
Multiple arrests; no convictions .
5 arrests; I convictionb .........
12 arrests; 4 convictions ........

-21

+1

n.s.

0

0

n.s.

- 6
+ 1

0
0

n.s.
n.s.

0

n.s.

+ 9

+21

-1

n.s.

- 9
+ 9

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

- 3
+ 3

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

-11.4
+11.4

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

-14.6
+ 14.6

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

Role
Accomplice ...................
Principal .....................
Method of Disposition
Plead guilty ..................
Found guilty .................
Dollar Damage
Under $1,000 .................
over $100,000 .................
Membership in Criminal Organization
Not a member ................
Member .....................
Use a Weapon
No weapon .....
..
-16.4
n.s.
n.s.
Weapon and injury ............
+16.4
n.s.
n.s.
a This represents the average across all sixteen scenarios of the sentences judges assign. In statistical terms, it is the grand raean. It provides a base for comparison of individual factor effects on
sentences, and has no meaning by itself. Because of the artificial nature of the cases, numerical
effects of specific characteristics should be used only as indicates and should not be compared to
real-world sentences.
b Estimate based on interpolation/extrapolation.
c Effect of this variable is not statistically significant.
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are presented it is valuable to discuss the role of case-specific goals on
prison time.
Case-Specift Goals
The foregoing section indicates the role of several offense and offender characteristics in judges' sentencing decisions. However, it leaves
unexamined the cognitive process underpinning those decisions. An implicit first step in sentencing is the articulation of a specific goal or intended function of the sentence imposed. 1 9
In this analysis we examined how, in each specific case, certain configurations of case attributes are associated with a particular goal or
goals. Since this process of goal articulation is fitted to the attributes of
each case, it may bear little relationship to the judge's overall philosophy regarding the functions of criminal sanctions.2 0 In other words,
these case-specific goals intervene between the offense/offender characteristics and the sentences, and result in sentences different from the ones
that would have occurred had other goals been sought. This proposition
of the role of case-specific goal articulation is captured in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
THE ROLE OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS

Judgment
Regarding

Offense/

Offender
Characteristics

0

The Most
Appropriate
Goal(s) of
The Sentence

0

Sentence
Imposed

The crucial point to be made about case-specific goals is that they

are a potential source of sentence disparity. If identical cases produce
divergent judgments about the appropriate goal and if the choice of a
19 Most theoretical and empirical work on sentencing discusses sentencing goals to some
extent. Some, such as W. GARFIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING
(1975), simply describe the major goals of sentencing on which there is a presumed consensus
among thejudiciary. Others focus on more specific issues, for example, the goals of imprisonment, see N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); REPORT OF THE 20TH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

(1975); or on the achievement of specific goals, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:
THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME AND CONTROL (1973). A few researchers have considered
how goals should be incorporated into sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 7.
20 Another report in this series discusses the impact on sentences of both case-specific and
overall goal philosophies. See D. Richardson, Sentencing Goals and their Application in the
Federal Courts, Yankelovich, Skelly & Wright, Inc. (Aug. 1980).
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particular goal is, in turn, related to the sentence that is imposed, disparity can result.

The survey provides data to test these hypotheses. Afterjudges sentenced the hypothetical offenders in the sixteen case scenarios, interviewers asked them to indicate the principal goal they hoped to achieve
with their sentence. 2 1 Table 13 shows the distribution of responses,
which appears to substantiate the proposition that identical cases yield
TABLE 13
THE RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS
FOR SIXTEEN OFFENSE/OFFENDER SCENARIOS
PRINCIPAL CASE-SPECIFIC-GOALS
NUMBER
OFFENSE/OFFENDER
CASE SCENARIOS

OF
OBSERVATIONS

1

GENERAL
DETER-

SPECIAL
DETER-

REHABILI-

INCAPACI-

RETRIBU-

RENCE

RENCE

TATION

TATION

TION

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)
10 1
39
18
25
8
10
1 - Bank robbery 2 ....
2- Fraud ...........
78
26
34
5
26
9
3 - Bank robbery .....
96
36
14
4
33
13
4 -Fraud ...........
81
30
26
38
2
4
5 - Bank robbery .....
64
52
20
5
12
11
6 -Fraud ...........
56
20
24
20
20
16
7 - Bank robbery .....
60
30
10
0
47
13
8 - Fraud ...........
53
15
21
55
0
9
9 - Fraud ...........
36
25
19
0
37
19
10 - Bank robbery .....
4030
23
25
10
12
11-Fraud ...........
43
51
16
12
14
7
12 - Bank robbery .....
54
22
30
7
30
11
13 -Fraud ...........
48
34
23
10
23
10
14 - Bank robbery .....
41
51
29
12
0
8
15 -Fraud ...........
25
24
40
12
0
24
16 - Bank robbery .....
47
43
15
4
34
4
I Any one judge answered this question for just the first four of the sixteen scenarios. Though
scenario cards were to be shuffled, there is some overrepresentation of the first cards and underrepresentation of the last.
2 Refer to Table 3 for the specific combination of factors associated with each scenario.

divergent goals among judges. In any given case, a goal rarely is cited
by less than 10% of the judiciary, but in only three cases does a majority
seek any single goal: general deterrence in cases 5, 11, and 14. Deterrence
is the goal most likely to drive sentence decisions. The average frequency of citation for general deterrence is 33%, followed by special deterrence (23%). Incapacitation (18%), rehabilitation (15%), and
retribution (11%) are less frequently pursued. Finally, the nature of the
crime seems to have some bearing on the intended purpose of the sen21 Each judge indicated the goal he hoped to achieve for only four of the 16 case scenarios.
Interviewers rotated the case scenarios about which they asked this question.
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tence. Bank robbery is more likely than fraud to prompt the judge to
seek the goals of general deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.
Conversely, special deterrence and rehabilitation are more often sought
in the fraud cases (see Table 14).22 While these are the goals expressed
as most important in specific cases, most judges also consider at least one
23
other goal somewhat applicable.
TABLE 14
AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS BY TYPE
OF CRIME
TOTAL

BANK

CASE

ROBBERY

FRAUD

SCENARIOS

SCENARIOS

SCENARIOS

(923)

(503)

(420)

CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS:

%

%

%

General deterrence ..........
Special deterrence ..........
Incapacitation ..............
Rehabilitation ..............
Retribution .................

33
22
19
15
11

38
18
22
11
11

28
26
15
21
11

(Number of Observations)

Does the intended purpose of the sentence influence the sentence
itself-the amount of prison time, supervised time, or fine? The goal
sought by the judge strongly influences the amount of prison time imposed (see Table 15). The influence of case-specific goals on the amount
of supervised time and fine is less pronounced. Such influence is largely
limited to the fraud cases (see Tables 16 and 17). In half of the cases
studied, the goal of incapacitation yields significantly longer prison
terms, while the goal of rehabilitation yields lighter prison sentences.
The desire to rehabilitate is also associated with more extensive periods
of supervision and lighter fines. The goals of retribution and deterrence
are somewhat more likely to prompt contracted periods of supervision
and heavier fines.
22 These results contrast somewhat with those presented in Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White Collar Ofender, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 479 (1980).
23 A further qualifier on these findings is that judges stated these goals post hoe. This
analysis does not demonstrate conclusively that the articulation of a goal is a causal force in
the formulation of a sentence.
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TABLE 15
THE EFFECT OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS ON PRISON TIME
IF SIGNIFICANT:

SIGNIFI-

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CASE
SCENARIOS

I - Bank robberya

2 - Fraud

NUMBER

CANCE

GOAL

GOAL

OF

LEVEL
OF FTEST
** *

ELICITING
HEAVIEST
SENTENCE

ELICITING
LIGHTEST
SENTENCE

Incapacitation

Rehabilitation

**

Special
Deterrence

Rehabilitation

**

Incapacitation
Incapacitation

Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation

OBSERVATIONS

101

78

345678910 -

Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud
Fraud
Bank robbery

96
81
69
56
60
53
36
40

11

Fraud

43

-

Bank robbery

12 - Bank robbery

54

13 - Fraud
14 - Bank robbery

48
41

**

Incapacitation

Special
Deterrence
Rehabilitatio n

Incapacitation
Incapacitation

Rehabilitatio n
Rehabilitatio n

Incapacitation
**
**

25
*
15 - Fraud
Incapacitation
Rehabilitatio n
16 - Bank robbery
47
a Refer to Table 3 for specific combinations of factors associated with each scenario.
* = Not significant ** = Significant at .20 level *** = Significant at .05 level

Divergent perceptions of the appropriate case-specific goals apparently aggravate the problem of disparity. In their response to the survey, judges did indeed pursue quite different goals for identical cases
and these disparate goals, in turn, resulted in disparate sentence decisions.
C.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL/COGNITIVE, CONTEXTUAL, AND
ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES OF SENTENCE DECISIONS

To this point, the discussion has focused on the importance of caserelated matters in the sentence decisionmaking process. The segment of
decision variance that remains unexplained by the attributes of the case
is labeled dissensus, or more simply, disparity. The analysis also indicated that sentence disparity is not a chance occurrence, whereby each
judge, in a totally random and idiosyncratic fashion, reacts differently to
a case. Instead, the survey uncovered patterns of disparity, namely: (a)
interactions between certain offense/offender characteristics and the

CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
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TABLE 16
THE EFFECT OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS ON SUPERVISED

TIME
IF SIGNIFICANT:

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CASE
SCENARIOS

I - Bank robberya
2 - Fraud

NUMBER
OF
OBSERVATIONS

SIGNIFICANCE
LEVEL
OF FTEST

101
78

***

GOAL
ELICITING
HEAVIEST
SENTENCE

GOAL
ELICITING
LIGHTEST
SENTENCE

Rehabilitation

Retribution
General
Deterrence

Rehabilitation

3 - Bank robbery
4 - Fraud
5
6
7
8
9
10

**"'

Incapacitation

General
Deterrence

Rehabilitation

Retribution

Rehabilitation

Special
Deterrence

Rehabilitation

General
Deterrence

- Bank robbery
- Fraud
- Bank robbery

11 -

Fraud
Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud

12 - Bank robbery

54

13 - Fraud

48

14 - Bank robbery

41

*
*
***

15 - Fraud
16 - Bank robbery
a Refer to Table 3 for specific combinations of factors associated with each scenario.
*
Not significant ** = Significant at .20 level *** = Significant at .05 level

judge, and (b) divergences of opinion among judges about the goal of
the sentence for each specific case.
This section poses additional questions about the sources of disparity by focusing on certain psychological/cognitive attributes of the
judge-primarily, patterned divergences in perceptions of the severity of
sentences and in predispositions to be harsh or lenient in sentencingand on judges' general attitudes toward sentencing and the judicial environment in which sentencing decisions are made. The key point about
these factors is that their relationship to the case itself is indirect at best.
They constitute the cognitive and social filter through which data about
the case must flow before a sentence decision is reached.
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TABLE 17
THE EFFECT OF CASE-SPECIFIC GOALS ON FINE
IF SIGNIFICANT:

OFFENSE/OFFENDER CASE
SCENARIOS

12 3 4-

Bank robberya
Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud
5 - Bank robbery

NUMBER
OF
OBSERVATIONS

101
78
96

SIGNIFICANCE
LEVEL
OF FTEST

_b

81
*

6 - Fraud
7 - Bank robbery
8 - Fraud

56
60
53

*

Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud
Bank robbery
Fraud
Bank robbery

36
40
43
54
48
41

*

-

GOAL
ELICITING
LIGHTEST
SENTENCE

...b
Retribution

Rehabilitation

Retribution

Rehabilitation

Special
Deterrence

Rehabilitation

_

64

9
10
Il
12
13
14

GOAL
ELICITING
HEAVIEST
SENTENCE

*

*
*
*
*
*

*
25
15 - Fraud
*
47
16 - Bank robbery
a Refer to Table 3 for specific combinations of factors associated with each scenario.
b Fines not given for these cases.

•

-

Not significant **

Significant at .20 level ***

- Significant at .05 level

Psychological/CognitiveFactors.- The Role ofJudges"Perceptions of Sentence
Severity and Predispositionsto be Lenient or Harsh
A revealing pattern cuts across Tables 15, 16 and 17-a kind of
reciprocal relationship between the goals sought by judges and the type
of sentence imposed. Thus, rehabilitative sentences tend to yield diminished prison time and increased supervised time, while retribution and
deterrence are associated with heavier fines and contracted periods of
supervision. This relationship is not particularly surprising, for it conforms to intuitive expectations. However, it is quite noteworthy as an
indicator of an important feature of sentence decisionmaking, namely
the cognitive process whereby judges simultaneously weigh both the significance of case attributes and the relative severity of the sentence options available. These latter considerations add to the complexity of
sentence decisions and constitute an additional potential source of disparity.
No single agreed-upon metric exists for the severity of the sentences
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TABLE 18
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS: EFFECTS OF
OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS,
JUDGES/ENVIRONMENT AND
INTERACTIONS ON COMPOSITE MEASURE OF SENTENCE SEVERITY
SOURCE OF VARIANCE

UNIQUE

SUM OF

MEAN

F-

VARIANCE

SQUARES

SQUARES

TEST

SIGNIFICANCE

Offense/Offender Characteristics
(main effects)

20%

1251

83

161

<.001

Judge/Environment (main effects)

65%

4087

33

64

<.001

Interaction Effects (between offense/offender characteristics and
between judge and offense/offender
characteristics)

15%

that judges impose. Judges appear to perceive the severity of any given
component of a sentence differently. They may also have markedly different perceptions of the severity equivalences across the various components of a sentence. For example, how severe is six months in prison as
contrasted with two years of supervision? Given these differential per-

ceptions, two judges quite possibly could reach identical conclusions
about the seriousness of each of the hypothetical cases presented in the
survey, but impose radically different sentences24 because they adhere to
radically different notions about the sentences' severity. Conversely, it is

possible that identical sentences given by two judges are a deceptive indication of consensus, because differences between their perceptions of
the seriousness of the case may be balanced by an opposite view about
the severity of the sentence.
To address this issue of sentencing tradeoffs, we conducted an analysis of perceived severity beginning with the creation of a composite
measure of sentence severity for each judge using a micromodeling procedure. Micromodeling consists of an examination of each judge's perception of the severity of a particular sentence using as a data,base their
ratings of various sentence combinations. This composite sentence was
then used as a dependent variable in an analysis of variance predicting
the sentences a judge imposed. The results appear in Table 18. Twenty
percent of the decision variance is attributable to the offense/offender
characteristics (main effects), and 15% is due to interactions among the
offense/offender characteristics and between judges and offense/offender
characteristics. The balance of the decision variance-a substantial
65%--is attributable to the judge given the assumptions of our design.
This confirms and enlarges on previous findings. Judges do indeed
24

Radically different sentences to observers are not necessarily different at all to judges.
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give different sentences for the same cases. The amount of dissensus
among judges is quite significant. In fact, the effect of the individual
judge on the composite sentence imposed is greater than it is on each
component separately. This suggests that one element of sentencing
guidelines might be to agree upon the units of exchange between alternative components of sentences.
Having established that alternative tradeoff patterns among sentencing alternatives account for some interjudge sentence disparity, we
are still left with the question: To what degree is sentence disparity attributable to differences in the perceived severity of sentences rather
than in the perceived seriousness of the case? A related question deals
with patterns of actual leniency/harshness of sentences: To what degree
is sentence disparity attributable to basic predispositions, or tendencies,
among judges to give sentences that are more or less harsh? The answers
to these queries are laden with policy implications. If discrepant perceptions of sentence severity and predispositions to sentence harshly or leniently contribute measurably to disparity, the problem of sentence
disparity is appropriately addressed by seeking consensus on the desired
underlying metric of sentence severity. This task could prove infinitely
more difficult than the development of guidelines because perceptions of
sentence severity are value-charged and psychologically and socially determined.
To explore these questions, we conducted another stage of the analysis in which: (a) judges were categorized based on their perceptions of
the relative severity of sentences; (b) they were further categorized based
on the relative actual harshness or leniency of their sentences; and (c)
the effects of these two dimensions on sentences were estimated. The
first step of this analysis was to calculate the average sentences (prison
time, supervision, and fine) across all judges for each of the sixteen scenarios. These average sentences were then fed through the judge-specific equations that related the three components of sentences in order to
estimate each judge's perception of the relative severity of the average
sentence. This was repeated for all sixteen of the hypothetical cases.
The sixteen severity estimates were then averaged for each judge, yielding a reliable estimate of each judge's perception of the relative severity
of different types of sentences.
This exercise enables us to classify judges according to theirperceptions of the severity of sentences. It enables us to answer questions such
as: Does Judge X believe that three years in prison is more or less severe
than Judge Y does? Or, more complexly, does Judge X believe that
three years of prison, plus one year of supervision, plus $1,000 fine is
more or less severe than Judge Y does? However, it does not enable us
to classify judges according to their actual lenienqy or harshness in
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TABLE 19
NINE-WAY CLASSIFICATION MATRIX FOR OVERALL
PERCEIVED SENTENCE SEVERITY AND LENIENCY
OR HARSHNESS OF SENTENCES GIVEN
IN SCENARIOS

OVERALL PERCEIVED
SENTENCE SEVERITY

HARSH
()

High

Medium

Low

15.097

13.624

12.770

13.830

-0.050

-0.320

0.371

0.828

0.527

0.223

0.365

(13)

(14)

(14)

OVERALL
14.284

13.070

11.938

13.095

-0.129

-0.140

0.268

0.093

0.201

0.149

0.262

(14)

(14)

(14)

13.577

12.655

10.011

12.081

0.179

0.460

-0.639

-0.921

0.213

0.146

1.358

(14)

(14)

(13)

Mean

14.319

13.116

11.471

Effect

1.317

0.114

-1.431

LENIENCY/
MEDIUM

HARSHNESS

IN RESPONSE
TO SCENARIOS

LENIENT

()

*

-

Mean

** = Effect

**

= Standard deviation

(7) Number in group.

sentences. This is an important distinction. Two judges with different
perceptions of sentence severity may nevertheless make quite similar
sentence decisions.
We accounted for the harshness/leniency factor by classifying
judges into a two-dimensional, nine-cell matrix. The first dimension of
the matrix took each judge's perceived sentence severity score and assigned each judge to one of three levels of perceived severity. For each
of these levels, judges were further classified into one of three levels of
relative leniency or harshness. Thus, judges who regard sentences as being rather severe were subdivided into those whose sentences for the sixteen cases were relatively harsh, those whose sentences were relatively
light, and those whose sentences fell in the middle of the spectrum. The
nine-way classification is displayed in Table 19.
While the procedure used to develop this classification system is
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TABLE 20
REPEATED MEASURE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS:
EFFECTS OF OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS,
OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF SENTENCE SEVERITY AND
OVERALL ACTUAL LENIENCY OR HARSHNESS
ON SENTENCE DECISIONS

SOURCE OF VARIANCE

Offense/Offender
Characteristics
Judge:

UNIQUE

F-

VARIANCE

TEST

SIGNIFICANCE

14%

161

< .001

39%
16%

296
120

<.001
<.001

3%

13

< .001

- Sentence severity percep-

tions
- Actual leniency/harshness
- Interaction: severity per-

ceptions and leniency/harshness
Residual Variance and
Other Interactions

28%

complicated, this should not obscure the straightforwardness of its underlying logic and its power as an analytic tool. The question that
prompted this entire sequence of analyses can now be posed in more
refined form. To what degree is sentence dissensus the result of (a) divergent perceptions of the severity of the sentences imposed, (b) patterned predispositions of judges to be relatively harsh or lenient, and (c)
an interaction between perceptions of severity and predispositions toward harshness or leniency? Perceived severity, relative harshness or leniency, and case characteristics were entered as independent variables into
a repeated measures analysis of variance to determine their effects on
sentencing decisions. 25 The results appear in Table 20. Thirty-nine per-

cent of the decision variance is linked to divergent perceptions of the
severity of sentences, and another 16% is attributable to judges' general
predispositions to be relatively harsh or lenient when sentencing. The
cumulative importance of these perceptions and practices of the judge
overwhelm the importance of case attributes in the sentence decisions
made for the sixteen hypothetical cases.
25 The case attributes were entered as sixteen levels, for the six hypothetical cases, in the
repeated measures design. This isolated the variance due to case attributes from the variance
due to perceived severity and relative harshness.
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Seemingly, then, the disparities we observed in sentences are not
random events. Rather, a substantial portion of this dissensus is attributable to divergent perceptions of the severity of the sentences that are
being meted out and predispositions on the part of judges to be more or
less harsh when sentencing.
The Role ofFactors that Have No Direct Bearing on the Case
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on factors that are either directly related to a case-the offender's background, the nature of
the offense, and the goal that the judge hopes to achieve with the sentence-or that are directly related to the nature of the sanction-notably the relative severity and harshness of the judges. We now turn to
four sets of factors that have little or no direct bearing on the case. The
first set includes the overall goal orientation of the judge (as opposed to
case-specific goals discussed previously) and the'judge's perception of
how satisfactorily the federal criminal justice system achieves these
goals. We analyzed the following orientations: general deterrence, special deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, retribution/deservedness,
and restitution. The second set includes the judge's evaluation of the
general quality of the federal sentencing process and his or her perception of the degree to which sentence disparity constitutes a problem for
the federal criminal justice system. The third set encompasses background characteristics of the judge: political ideology (self-identification
as liberal or conservative); career variables, such as the number of years
served as a federal judge and years in the legal profession; the type of
community in which the judge was raised (urban/suburban/rural); and
the judge's race. The fourth factor is the region of the country in which
the judge's jurisdiction is located-with judges separated into four major sections of the country. These variables were entered as independent
variables into a step-wise multiple regression in which the dependent
variable was mean prison time given across all sixteen cases. 26 The results appear in Table 21.27

Approximately 40% of the variance in prison time sentences is attributable to these factors-a surprising and important finding in view
26 Thus this analysis disregarded the role of offense/offender factors. The analysis reported here is for a subsample of 116 judges who received all of these questions. There were
some missing observations for a number of respondents, but analysis ofjudges for whom there
were not missing observations yielded parallel results.
27 To this point, all analyses have involved analysis of variance or cross-statistics. The
primary reasons for the use of ANOVA has been (a) the orthogonality in the design of the
sentence decisionmaking questions; and (b) the fact that the case-specific goals were nominal
variables. Conversely, the shift to regression analysis in this section stems from two considerations: (a) the multicollinearity among the independent variables; and (b) the fact that the
independent variables are nominal and scalar.
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TABLE 21
THE EFFECT OF NONCASE FACTORS ON PRISON TIME
JUDGE PERCEPTIONS OR
CHARACTERISTICS

The system's achievement of
special deterrence goal

INCREMENTAL
VARIANCE

B-

BETA

T-

COEFFICIENT

COEFFICIENT

TEST

7.3%

-29.671

Importance of incapacitation
goal
The system's achievement of

5.6%

18.079

rehabilitation goal

4.9%

Region of the country

4.8%

Political ideology

3.5%

The system's achievement of
retribution goal

2.8%

Importance of general deterrence goal

2.4%

Other variables combined

8.2%

0.319

-3.72

SIGNIFCANCE

.01

0.245

3.26

.01

17.802

0.231

3.05

.01

10.924

0.236

3.02

.01

11.644

0.196

2.59

.05

-13.344
13.621

-0.180
0.177

-2.29
2.12

.05
.05

Multiple R 2 = .395

of their remoteness from the case. Even more interesting, however, is the
particular variables that come into play. All of the significant variables
except for region of the country represent value orientations or attitudes
rather than background characteristics of the judge. 28 Of these value
orientations, political ideology appears to be the one that is most removed from the issue of criminal sanctions, with those judges who regard themselves as liberal giving less prison time than their conservative
counterparts. The bulk of the variance, however, relates to the judge's
perceptions regarding the overall goals of sentences-both the importance attached to the goals and evaluations of how well the goals are
being accomplished. Thus, the more important the goals of incapacitation and general deterrence, particularly the former, the greater the
prison time given by the judge. Judges' views about which goals the
system actually is accomplishing are associated with different sentences.
Judges who believe that the system is helping to rehabilitate criminals
give heavier sentences on average. On the other hand, those who believe
the system is achieving special deterrence and retribution give lighter
sentences on average. Southern judges give substantially heavier
sentences than others.
These findings challenge the view that guidelines will impair the
28 The failure of these background variables to enter the regression equation is primarily a
consequence of their modest relationship with the dependent variable rather than multicollinearity with other independent variables.
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individualized justice of the current sentencing process. According to
this view, the judge is a complex and meticulous information processor.
Every nuance of the case is considered and weighed against extensive
data on the offender's past and subtle hypotheses about his or her probable future criminal behavior. How can guidelines replicate this complexity and produce sentence decisions as wise and just as those
produced by judges? These analyses do not discredit the view that sentencing decisions are complex, nor the inference that those who design
guidelines should strive toward commensurate complexities. Quite the
contrary, findings reported earlier in this paper, as well as the results
from analyses of actual sentence decisions, reinforce these claims.
Yet, the conclusion that emerges from these analyses is that the
characteristics of the case and offender tell only part of the story about
sentence decisions. The judge's general value orientation and, to a lesser
degree, his or her regional environment, also imprint decisions about the
amount of time a defendant should spend in prison.
To a significant degree,. prison sentences given for the sixteen hypothetical cases represent specific applications, or projections, of a judge's
political philosophy and his or her core values about the desired functions of criminal sanctions. Then, too, the tendency of prison sentences
to expand or contract depending on how well the system is believed to
achieve certain goals suggests that particular sentences also serve as remedies for the perceived failures in the system at large. In a sense, then,
judges appear already to be using self-made guidelines in reaching sentence decisions. The shortcoming of these self-made guidelines is the
lack of consistency of composition across judges.
IV.

SUMMARY

The survey results suggest a considerable need for guidelines that
would structure judicial sentencing discretion. Disparity is a widespread
phenomenon. At least for the hypothetical cases studied in the survey,
substantial dissensus exists among judges about the sentences that convicted offenders should serve. When one considers that only one type of
disparity was measured in tle survey (ie., dissensus among judges and
not instability over time), the level of real world disparity is likely to
actually exceed that which is reported here.
Moreover, the survey sheds light on the nature and sources of disparity. Part of the problem of disparity reflects unexplainable, perhaps
random, differences ofjudgment. However, a significant amount of disparity is not at all random; judges do not extemporize sentences each
time they reach a sentence decision. Rather, disparities are anchored in
patterned differences regarding such matters as: (a) overall value orien-
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tations about the functions of criminal sanction; (b) judgments about
the appropriate goal of case-specific sentences; (c) perceptions about the
severity and the sentences themselves; (d) predispositions to sentence in
a relatively harsh or lenient fashion; and (e) perceptions of the seriousness of particular attributes of a case.
These patterns are related not just to the case of the offender who is
being sentenced, but bear a significant relationship to the characteristics
of the judge who is doing the sentencing. Thus, guidelines will yield two
general consequences for the criminal justice system. The first manifest
consequence is to diminish disparity by specifying, more or less precisely,
the importance that each case and offender attribute should assume in
arriving at a sentence. However, by enhancing the order and structure
of these decisions as they relate to case/offender characteristics, guidelines will have an equal and opposite effect on the hidden order that
characterizes current decisionmaking. This is the second, latent function of guidelines-to help make explicit norms and practices that currently guide sentence decisions. Guidelines need not be viewed
narrowly as a means of imposing order on chaos; they can be viewed
more broadly as a mechanism for replacing one type of order, which is
created by the judge, with another type, which is created by the sentencing 'commission.

